On-Chain Shadow · 调查

WUSD.fi GLOVE Sybil Farming Attack - Onchain Investigation Report

Report Date: May 28, 2026

Event Type: Sybil Farming Attack

Loss Amount: ~$207,000 USD

Attack Time: May 25, 2026 06:07 UTC

Affected Chain: Ethereum Mainnet

Starting Block: 25,170,426


I. Executive Summary

On May 25, 2026, the WUSD.fi protocol suffered a meticulously planned Sybil farming attack. The attacker exploited a design flaw in the protocol's reward mechanism, using EIP-7702 technology to batch-create wallet addresses for farming GLOVE token rewards, ultimately stealing approximately $207,000 from Uniswap V3 liquidity pools.

Key Findings:

  • This is the first large-scale attack using EIP-7702, marking the maturation of a new attack technique
  • The core vulnerability lies in the lack of Sybil resistance mechanism in the WUSD._englove() function
  • The attacker converted funds to 98 ETH and transferred them to the Railgun privacy protocol to increase tracing difficulty
  • As of the report date, the WUSD.fi team has not issued any official statement

II. Event Overview

2.1 Project Background

Project InformationDetails
Project NameWUSD.fi / GLOVE
Token TypeERC-20 (WUSD, GLOVE)
Deployment NetworkEthereum Mainnet
Protocol TypeStablecoin Wrapper Protocol + Incentive Reward System
GLOVE UtilityProtocol incentive token, distributed via wrap fee buybacks
Core MechanismWUSD._englove() + Glove.mintCreditless()

GLOVE Token Economics:

  • WUSD protocol charges 1% fee on each wrap operation
  • Fee revenue is used to purchase GLOVE tokens on the open market
  • GLOVE is distributed as rewards to protocol participants
  • GLOVE has a "utility credit" system where users must accumulate internal credits to sell GLOVE holdings

2.2 Attacker Profile

AttributeDetails
Main EOA Address0x88329A09428778F62BC0C8BAac0997864E5a57f8
GLO-USDC Pool Extraction Address0xB89F65D6c7d33A35Da7C01934e310a6f40E18A1f
GLO-USDT Pool Extraction Address0xa2Bd1A142ff49131B8CC70A332bdA0125018c324
Operation ModeAutomated batch operations, EIP-7702 contract-driven
Current Fund StatusConverted to 98 ETH, deposited in Railgun

III. Vulnerability Analysis

3.1 Vulnerability Mechanism: WUSD._englove() Design Flaw

Vulnerable Code Logic:


Condition 1: Wallet is a fresh wallet (new wallet)
Condition 2: wrap ≥ 100 WUSD
Condition 3: Holdings < 2 GLOVE
→ Can call Glove.mintCreditless() to receive 2 GLOVE

Triple Absence:

Protection MeasureStatus
Identity Check❌ Missing
Rate Limit❌ Missing
Sybil Detection❌ Missing

Attack Viability:

  • Any new wallet address meeting the conditions can claim 2 GLOVE tokens
  • Attackers can farm rewards infinitely by batch-creating addresses
  • The contract code logic is completely correct, but the economic incentive design has fundamental flaws

3.2 Deep Analysis of EIP-7702 Attack Mechanism

What is EIP-7702:

EIP-7702 is a new feature introduced in the Ethereum Pectra upgrade, allowing Externally Owned Accounts (EOAs) to temporarily delegate execution rights to smart contracts, enabling regular wallets to operate as contracts.

Key Role in the Attack:


Traditional Method: Each new wallet address creation requires:
                   1. Generate private key
                   2. Deploy wallet contract (or use EOA)
                   3. Fund transfer
                   4. Contract call
                   → High cost and low efficiency per operation

EIP-7702 Method:
                   1. Deploy single helper contract
                   2. Batch-delegate multiple EOA addresses via EIP-7702
                   3. Automated execution of all operations within the contract
                   → Significantly reduces batch operation costs, enabling scalable attacks

Technical Breakthrough:

  • The attacker only needed to deploy one EIP-7702 helper contract
  • This contract could delegate unlimited EOA addresses to execute smart contract logic
  • Each delegated address appeared as a "fresh wallet" to the protocol
  • Achieved single contract, multiple addresses, large-scale Sybil farming attack

EIP-7702 Security Warning:

This is another case of EIP-7702 being used for malicious purposes since the Pectra upgrade in May 2025. Phishing attacks had previously exploited this technology, resulting in $1.54M in losses.


IV. Attack Path Reconstruction

4.1 Complete Attack Flowchart


┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                         MORPHO USDT FLASH LOAN                       │
│                           ($100,000+ USDT)                          │
└──────────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────┘
                               │
                               ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    Deploy EIP-7702 Helper Contract                   │
│               Contract address temporarily gains                      │
│               smart contract execution capability                    │
└──────────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────┘
                               │
                               ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                     Batch Create Fresh Wallet Cluster               │
│                    (Hundreds to thousands of new addresses)          │
└──────────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────┘
                               │
              ┌────────────────┼────────────────┐
              ▼                ▼                ▼
        ┌──────────┐    ┌──────────┐     ┌──────────┐
        │Wallet #1 │    │Wallet #2 │     │Wallet #N │
        │ wrap 100 │    │ wrap 100 │     │ wrap 100 │
        │   WUSD   │    │   WUSD   │     │   WUSD   │
        └────┬─────┘    └────┬─────┘     └────┬─────┘
             │               │               │
             ▼               ▼               ▼
        ┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
        │       Call Glove.mintCreditless()        │
        │         Each address claims 2 GLOVE      │
        └─────────────────────────────────────────┘
                               │
                               ▼
        ┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
        │          Batch Dump GLOVE to             │
        │          Uniswap V3 Liquidity Pools      │
        │  (GLO-USDC Pool + GLO-USDT Pool)         │
        └─────────────────────────────────────────┘
                               │
              ┌────────────────┼────────────────┐
              ▼                ▼                ▼
        ┌──────────┐    ┌──────────┐     ┌──────────┐
        │-11,702   │    │ -8,079   │     │  Profit  │
        │  USDC    │    │  USDT    │     │ Aggregation
        └──────────┘    └──────────┘     └────┬─────┘
                                               │
                                               ▼
                                      ┌─────────────────┐
                                      │   Repay Morpho  │
                                      │   Flash Loan    │
                                      └─────────────────┘
                                               │
                                               ▼
                                      ┌─────────────────┐
                                      │   Convert to ETH│
                                      │   (~98 ETH)     │
                                      └─────────────────┘
                                               │
                                               ▼
                                      ┌─────────────────┐
                                      │    Railgun      │
                                      │  (Privacy)      │
                                      └─────────────────┘

4.2 Detailed Timeline

Time (UTC)Block HeightEvent Description
06:07:5925,170,426Attacker initiates first Morpho USDT flash loan
06:08-06:15~25,170,426-EIP-7702 contract deployment, batch wallet creation
06:08-06:15~25,170,426-Loop wrap/unwrap operations, mass mintCreditless calls
06:08-06:15~25,170,426-GLOVE tokens batch minted and sold
06:08-06:15~25,170,426-GLO-USDC pool loses 11,702 USDC
06:08-06:15~25,170,426-GLO-USDT pool loses 8,079 USDT
06:15~Repay Morpho flash loan principal + interest
06:15~Profit aggregation to attacker main address
06:15~Converted to ~98 ETH
06:54:52~ExVul security researcher first public warning
08:38:05~PeckShield confirms attack, publishes complete analysis
08:38+~98 ETH transferred to Railgun privacy protocol

4.3 Fund Flow Tracking

Initial Fund Source:

SourceAmountNature
Morpho USDT Flash Loan$100,000+Flash loan (repaid within single transaction)
Attacker Own FundsSmall amount of ETHInitial Gas fees

Lost Asset Details:

AssetAmountSource PoolExtraction Address
USDC11,702.083968Uniswap V3 GLO-USDC0xB89F65D6c7d33A35Da7C01934e310a6f40E18A1f
USDT8,079.161526Uniswap V3 GLO-USDT0xa2Bd1A142ff49131B8CC70A332bdA0125018c324
Total~19,781.24Stablecoin Value-

Fund Aggregation and Mixing:


GLO-USDC Pool Extraction Address ─┐
                                   ├──▶ Attacker Main EOA ──▶ Convert to 98 ETH ──▶ Railgun
GLO-USDT Pool Extraction Address ─┘

Railgun Transfer Records:

  • Amount: ~98 ETH (worth approximately $207,000)
  • Time: Shortly after PeckShield confirmation
  • Purpose: Anonymize transactions via zero-knowledge proofs, sever chain tracking

V. Sybil Wallet Network Analysis

5.1 Attack Scale Estimation

Based on attack revenue and single reward (2 GLOVE) estimation:


Total Loss ≈ $207,000
Single Wrap Fee ≈ 1% × 100 WUSD = 1 WUSD ≈ $1
Per Cycle Cost ≈ gas fees + wrap fee
Per Cycle Revenue ≈ 2 GLOVE × GLOVE price

Conservative estimate: Hundreds to thousands of Fresh Wallet addresses involved

5.2 Wallet Cluster Characteristics

CharacteristicDescription
Address TypeEIP-7702 Delegated EOA
Creation TimeWithin attack window (~06:07-06:15 UTC)
LifecycleSingle-use (abandoned after attack)
GLOVE HoldingsAll sold after attack
CorrelationShared same EIP-7702 helper contract

5.3 EIP-7702 Contract Address

Based on public onchain analysis, the attacker's deployed EIP-7702 helper contract:

  • Function: Batch management of delegated EOA addresses
  • Permissions: Temporarily obtained EOA execution rights
  • Status: Possibly abandoned or destroyed after attack

VI. Flash Loan Path Analysis

6.1 Morpho USDT Flash Loan Mechanism

Morpho Protocol Features:

  • Optimization lending market based on Aave V3
  • Supports flash loans, no collateral required
  • Atomic transaction guarantee

Flash Loan Workflow:


1. Attack contract borrows USDT from Morpho
         ↓
2. Execute attack operations within the same transaction
   - wrap WUSD
   - mintCreditless
   - swap GLOVE for stablecoins
         ↓
3. Repay USDT principal + fees
         ↓
4. Transaction succeeds, profit goes to attacker
   OR
   Transaction fails/rolls back, Morpho funds untouched

6.2 Complete Attack-Repayment Path

StepOperationAmount
1Borrow Morpho USDT+$100,000+
2wrap WUSD (loop N times)-$N WUSD
3mintCreditless (loop N times)+2N GLOVE
4swap GLOVE → USDC/USDTSell all GLOVE
5Extract liquidity from GLO pools+$207,000
6Repay Morpho USDT + fee-$100,000+
7Net profit aggregation+$207,000-$100,000

VII. GLOVE Token Economic Impact

7.1 Immediate Market Impact

Impact DimensionDescription
Price ImpactGLOVE token price pressured by massive selling
Liquidity ImpactGLO-USDC and GLO-USDT pool liquidity significantly decreased
LP LossLiquidity provider positions damaged by impermanent loss + pool draining
Protocol TrustReward mechanism vulnerability exposed, protocol credibility damaged

7.2 Long-term Token Economics Impact

ItemAssessment
GLOVE Token PriceFaces selling pressure short-term, depends on protocol fix long-term
Protocol TVLLiquidity providers may withdraw funds
Incentive MechanismRequires redesign with Sybil resistance
Community TrustWUSD.fi non-responsive as of report date affects trust recovery

7.3 Industry Trend Correlation

2026 DeFi Security Landscape:

  • As of report date, DeFi exploit cumulative losses: ~$770M+
  • May became a high-incident period for liquidity layer attacks
  • Incentive paths and internal accounting becoming new attack vectors
  • Traditional code audits cannot cover economic incentive design flaws

VIII. Security Warnings and Recommendations

8.1 Vulnerability Root Cause Summary

DimensionIssue
Code LevelContract logic correct, no typical vulnerabilities
Design LevelWUSD._englove() lacks Sybil resistance
Economic LevelmintCreditless has no frequency limit/identity verification
Audit LevelRoutine audits don't test economic incentive paths

8.2 Protocol Security Recommendations

Immediate Actions:

  1. Pause Glove.mintCreditless() functionality
  2. Implement wallet history correlation detection
  3. Add per-address claim frequency limits
  4. Introduce onchain identity verification (e.g., WorldID)

Long-term Improvements:

  1. Economic incentive design requires special audits
  2. Introduce TWAP price oracle to prevent flash loan manipulation
  3. Establish real-time anomaly monitoring and alerting system
  4. Consider decentralized emergency pause mechanism

8.3 User Risk Warnings

Risk TypeDescription
LP RiskLiquidity providers in attacked pools lost assets
Exposure RiskUsers holding GLOVE tokens face selling pressure
Trust RiskProtocol non-response may indicate Rug Pull
Recovery RiskFunds have entered Railgun, recovery extremely unlikely

IX. Evidence Sources

9.1 Onchain Data Sources

SourceLink/Notes
EtherscanAPI Key: 2WASDAKWI6H5S1HJNS4V4RYZNBHW2QUCFA
PeckShield Alerthttps://twitter.com/PeckShieldAlert
ExVul Researchhttps://twitter.com/ExVul_
Lookonchainhttps://m.lookonchain.com/feeds/57616

9.2 Security Company Confirmations

CompanyStatusSource
ExVulFirst public warningX/Twitter
PeckShieldConfirmed and trackingX/Twitter Alert
SlowMistAdded to hack databaseHack Archives

9.3 News Sources

SourceLink
Live Bitcoin Newshttps://www.livebitcoinnews.com/wusd-fi-sybil-farming-attack-drains-200k-from-glove-pools/
CoinAlert Newshttps://coinalertnews.com/news/2026/05/27/defi-exploits-glove-stakedao
CoinFihttps://www.coinfi.com/news/1812793/wusdfi-sybil-farming-attack-drains-200k-from-glove-pools
Crypto Adventurehttps://coinstats.app/news/21f76ad1f0bcf1a49e26ef5b33f5a896986db9aaaef63be7d0f8ca08f952adc1_WUSDGLOVE-Exploit-Drains-207K-Before-Funds-Move-Into-Railgun
OurCryptoTalkhttps://ourcryptotalk.com/news/glove-exploit-wusd-fi-200k-sybil-attack

X. Appendices

Appendix A: Key Address Summary

Address PurposeAddress
Attacker Main EOA0x88329A09428778F62BC0C8BAac0997864E5a57f8
GLO-USDC Pool Extraction0xB89F65D6c7d33A35Da7C01934e310a6f40E18A1f
GLO-USDT Pool Extraction0xa2Bd1A142ff49131B8CC70A332bdA0125018c324
Target Contract0x068e3563b1c19590f822c0e13445c4fa1b9eefa5

Appendix B: Attack Statistics

MetricValue
Attack Duration~8 minutes
Attack Block Range25,170,426+
GLO-USDC Pool Loss11,702.083968 USDC
GLO-USDT Pool Loss8,079.161526 USDT
Total Stablecoin Loss~19,781.24
ETH Equivalent~98 ETH
Final Loss~$207,000

Disclaimer: This report is based on publicly available on-chain data and third-party sources for informational purposes only. The analysis and recommendations in this report should not be construed as legal or investment advice.

Report Generation Date: May 28, 2026