On-Chain Shadow · 调查

StablR Stablecoin Hack Investigation Report

Date: May 27, 2026

Event: StablR EURR/USDR Stablecoin Admin Key Attack

Attack Time: May 24, 2026

Investigator: Onchain Shadow


Executive Summary

MiCA-compliant stablecoin issuer StablR suffered a major security incident. Attackers compromised a 1-of-3 multisig private key, obtained minting permissions, and minted approximately $13.5 million in unbacked stablecoins (8.35M USDR + 4.5M EURR), cashing out approximately $2.8 million (1,115 ETH) through DEX dumping.

Core Irony: StablR holds a Maltese Financial Regulator license, claims MiCA compliance, but minting permissions were protected by only a 1-of-3 multisig—one private key compromised and the entire system fell.


Key Metrics

MetricValue
Fake Token Face Value~$13.5M (8.35M USDR + 4.5M EURR)
Actual Cash-Out Amount~$2.8M (1,115 ETH)
EURR Depeg Extent-23% ($1.15 → $0.88)
USDR Depeg Extent-30% ($1.00 → $0.40 low)
Multisig Configuration1-of-3 (one signature suffices)
Attack Duration>3 hours (slow team response)

Attacker Addresses

RoleAddressNotes
Primary Attack Wallet0xD4677B5A8B1b97EA213Fdb876b0FcBAB3f9F6CD1Added as multisig owner, then executed minting
Secondary Wallet0x482aC1a69A41e7657DE6B420B7346FB09DA09115Replaced original compromised owner
Tertiary Wallet0xbC631Daf86611f32FAA63E7EC8c9c9571F2F5BB3Replaced legitimate owner
Compromised Owner0xC73fD562de86d7860EE636C20813Bcb2cF4D550dPrivate key stolen
ZachXBT Tagged Address 10xea480c23d7b29a515856aafe0dc86f7519965a04Via CCTP/Noble deposit
ZachXBT Tagged Address 20x09BE1A36c2d7f9909eb3D6F9184c6e46A12B0ACAAssociated address
ZachXBT Tagged Address 30x6283558eB6948CA50A2bE942D98A41ca4d1Def40Associated address
ZachXBT Tagged Address 40xf1f70d7461356f32b97ddc2cd54a490d4363340eAssociated address
ZachXBT Tagged Address 50x74b4621b82eb31c5fd9fbad5729bef1813e26dcfAssociated address
ZachXBT Tagged Address 60x8aaa93d06bf8de94c282f66a16effe6d9d94d038Associated address
ZachXBT Tagged Address 70x5D2184d84b82B67c1818Bbec8ce81E7Df14F6bAbAssociated address

Affected Contracts

ContractAddress
USDR Token0x7B43E3875440B44613DC3bC08E7763e6Da63C8f8
EURR Token0x50753CfAf86c094925Bf976f218D043f8791e408
Multisig Wallet0xF45392bd2D6e6b8C5Dc26BA6c8a12889419B82F3

Key Transaction Hashes

TransactionHashDescription
Ownership Change 10x1f8a6764f66bb5a2438dc62f89bfe52080dbca782444c3757dbf1e1ce3a11becAttacker replaced legitimate owner
Ownership Change 20xde5bc3b7b80576f894fbc7e2c8fea5f8829503bae75dcf30a27725cd95a05f16Attacker replaced original compromised owner
Minting Transaction0xa720...24edMinted USDR/EURR

Attack Timeline (UTC)

TimeEvent
Before 5/24Attacker deposited funds to wallet via CCTP/Noble
5/24 Attack StartAttacker used compromised private key to operate multisig
Step 1Added 0xD467...6CD1 as multisig new owner
Step 2Replaced legitimate owner 0xD4b6...aD40 → 0xbC63...5BB3
Step 3Replaced compromised owner 0xC73f...550d → 0x482a...9115
Step 4Minted 8.35M USDR + 4.5M EURR via 0xD467...6CD1
Step 5Dumped on Uniswap and other DEXs for ETH
Step 6Used admin privileges to blacklist/burn 2.7M EURR from legitimate users
3+ hoursStablR team unresponsive; ZachXBT helped freeze 6-figure funds
8 hours laterAttack stopped; StablR issued statement

Technical Analysis

Root Cause: 1-of-3 Multisig = Single Point of Failure

StablR's minting multisig was configured at 1-of-3 threshold, meaning any 1 of 3 signers could authorize transactions. This degraded the entire stablecoin system's security to a single private key.

Comparison:

  • Harmony Horizon Bridge (2022, $100M hack): At least 2-of-5
  • Industry Standard: 2-of-3 or 3-of-5 + hardware wallets + geographic distribution
  • StablR: 1-of-3 — weaker than a bridge hacked two years ago

Attack Method Breakdown

  1. Key Acquisition: Attacker obtained private key of owner 0xC73f...550d (method undisclosed; possible phishing/malware/supply chain attack)
  2. Permission Takeover: Using 1-of-3 threshold, just one signature enabled:
  • Adding attacker address as new owner
  • Removing legitimate owners
  • Obtaining 100% multisig control
  1. Unlimited Minting: Called mint function via compromised multisig
  2. DEX Cash-Out: Dumped newly minted tokens on Uniswap and other DEXs; shallow liquidity pools resulted in significant discounts
  3. Countering Legitimate Users: Used admin privileges to blacklist+burn legitimate user tokens, preventing redemption

Why Only $2.8M Cash-Out from $13.5M Face Value?

  • USDR/EURR DEX liquidity pools extremely shallow (EURR market cap only $14M; USDR market cap $11M)
  • Large dumps caused massive slippage
  • Depeg triggered panic selling, further deteriorating prices

Background & Impact

Who is StablR?

  • Malta-registered EMI (Electronic Money Institution) license holder
  • Uses Tether's Hadron tokenization infrastructure
  • Received Tether strategic investment in December 2024
  • Received Kraken investment in July 2025
  • Claims EURR/USDR trading volume exceeded €3 billion in H1 2025
  • MiCA compliant; reserve funds held in segregated accounts

2026 DeFi Attack Pattern Shift

According to DefiLlama data:

  • 70%+ of 2026 large DeFi losses stem from key/management permission theft, not smart contract vulnerabilities
  • April single month lost $634 million across 28+ incidents, worst month on record
  • LayerZero bridge exploits (18%), admin key theft (16%), fake tokens (14%), private key leaks (11%)
  • This case belongs to the same attack pattern as Echo Protocol and Drift Protocol

Irony of European Stablecoin Regulation

  • Attack occurred as ECB pushed for tighter euro stablecoin liquidity rules
  • ECB President Lagarde just stated euro stablecoins pose potential financial stability risks
  • EURR accounts for only 0.24% of Ethereum fiat stablecoin total
  • MiCA compliance ≠ Technical Security

Pending Deep Investigation Areas

  1. Attacker Identity Tracing: Trace KYC information at CCTP/Noble deposit source
  2. Compromised Key Acquisition Method: Phishing/insider/supply chain?
  3. ZachXBT's 7 Tagged Associated Addresses: Complete fund flow mapping
  4. Burned 2.7M EURR: Whose assets were destroyed? Legal consequences?
  5. Tether/Kraken Investor Responsibility: Did they conduct adequate technical due diligence?
  6. Fund Freeze Progress: Was 6-figure freeze successful? Where did remaining funds go?

Data Sources


Investigator: Onchain Shadow

Disclaimer: This report is based on publicly available on-chain data and media reports for security research purposes only.